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Abstract 
This thesis covers the changed foreign policy of Morocco vis-à-vis the EU. In order to 
explain this change three core international aspects influencing Morocco are assessed: 
migration, terrorism and the Western Sahara. For each aspect both the consequences on the 
EU-Morocco relation and the domestic situation are addressed. This study argues that due to 
rising migration numbers and an increased terror threat, Morocco became increasingly 
important to the EU. Simultaneously this study argues that the Moroccan King has become 
more occupied with stabilizing his country since the Arab Spring. In order to maintain 
stability, a halt on cooperation with the EU on migration was required. Domestic 
developments allocated greater importance to the Western Sahara question rendering 
prominence to the EU’s aloof position vis-à-vis the Western Sahara. This study 
demonstrates that a state’s foreign policy is a result of both international and domestic 
factors. 
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1. Introduction  
 
In January 2017 Morocco re-joined the African Union (AU) after an absence of 33 years. 
The Moroccan press hailed the return of Morocco in the AU and heralded it as a glorious 
result of the efforts of Morocco’s King Mohammed VI. The King himself portrayed the new 
membership in his own words as an act of retaking Morocco’s “natural place inside the 
African family” 1 . Mohammed VI declared that Morocco would support the further 
development of Africa2.   
The renewed membership is not an isolated event, but part of a general shift of 
Morocco’s policy towards Africa. Over the last years, a change in Morocco’s political focus 
has become visible: slowly but steadily Africa is becoming more important in Morocco’s 
foreign policy (Tadlou 2015). Lately, Morocco has been investing in trade agreements with 
countries throughout Africa. 118 Business agreements were signed on the Kings last trips, 
and the overall trade tripled (Berahab 2017, 4). Morocco is also intensifying direct 
investments in Africa and is even surpassing several European countries on direct 
investment in Africa (Berahab 2017, 4). Besides the thriving economic ties between 
Morocco and Africa, the political ties show an increasing development as well. The King 
visits more African countries than European ones to demonstrate his country’s engagement 
in Africa (DEPF 2017, 7). During these trips charity projects are generously initiated, with a 
view to portray Morocco´s goodwill towards Africa. Finally, the King seeks to strengthen 
the ties with the other Muslim countries in Africa from a religious angle as well. When the 
King visits Islamic states in Africa, he brings Korans and on occasions he is even 
accompanied by Imams to convey a moderate Islam (Tadloui 2015, 5). 
Alongside with Morocco’s shift of attention towards Africa, Morocco is also 
taking a harder stance towards the European Union (EU). Morocco is becoming more and 
more reluctant to prevent migrants from entering the EU. In February some six hundred 
migrants were able to enter the Spanish enclaves in Morocco, while Morocco arguably had 
the means and opportunities to prevent it. It is therefore seen as a case of wilful negligence 
                                                                 
1 Speech of Mohammed VI during the 27th AU summit July 2017 Available at 
<http://allafrica.com/stories/201607181039.html >  
 
2 Speech of Mohammed VI during the King and People’s Revolution Day August 20, 2016 Available at 
<https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2016/08/194754/text-king-mohammed-vis-speech-king-peoples-revolution-day/> 
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of Morocco in taking care of its border security in order to show the EU its control on the 
situation (Aljazeera 2017). Morocco’s tone towards the EU changed too. Where Morocco 
would previously remain dutifully silent on EU policies it disapproved of, it currently even 
dared to condemn the EU publicly. After the Court of Justice of the European Union found 
the EU-Morocco trade agreement not applicable to the territory of the Western Sahara, 
Morocco showed its discontent. Morocco explicitly demands the EU to solve the problems 
in the execution of the trade agreement resulting from this judgment, meanwhile threatening 
to stop controlling the borders. This is a tone unheard of a decade ago (Aljazeera 2017). 
Furthermore, although Morocco and the EU partly agreed to cooperate on the return of 
illegal migrants from the EU to Morocco (The Council of the EU 2013), it currently refuses 
to admit both third country migrants and Moroccan migrants coming from the EU (Zardo & 
Cavatorta 2016, 13). 
These developments do indeed warrant the question why Morocco is changing its 
policy. This change at first sight appears illogical when one considers the strength of the ties 
between Morocco and the EU. For decades Morocco has been a steadfast partner of the EU 
(Maggi 2016, 96). Morocco obtained an exceptionally positive European Neighbourhood 
Policy with the EU before any other country in the region did so (European Union 2013). In 
2008, Morocco was the first country in the region to achieve the ‘advanced status’ (the 
highest possible status) inside the Neighbourhood Policy (European Union 2013; Arieff 
2012, 14). In addition to the advanced status, an agreement to further improve the relation 
between Morocco and the EU in the near future was signed. In 2010, a summit was held 
between the EU and Morocco, reaffirming and applauding the strength of the cooperation 
and ending with a firm handshake on even warmer and more strategic cooperation (Council 
of The EU 2010; Arieff 2012, 15). In conclusion; Morocco historically and until very 
recently, clearly and solely focused on the EU having strong economic ties with Europe 
(European Union 2013). 
The overarching question that thus comes to mind is the following: why did Morocco 
change its foreign policy? The ‘advanced status’ within the EU Neighbourhood Policy, 
paved the way for years of stable trade and foreign policy. Moreover, Morocco would 
already have thumbed its nose to Europe by mere economic expansion to Africa, but the 
change is broader and more substantial. The sympathy act performed by the King in Africa 
indeed lends support to the thought that Morocco is actively trying to create stronger 
diplomatic relations with African countries as well, rather than solely economically. In this 
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research I will focus on the developments in the relationship between Morocco and the EU 
to see if they provide for an explanation for Morocco´s changed policy. I work from the 
following question: What led to Morocco’s foreign policy change towards the European 
Union?  
To answer this question I use the following structure. Chapter 2 covers the literature 
review. This part seeks to discuss the relevant literature and to find an approach of foreign 
policy helpful for conducting this research. Chapter 3 describes Ripsman, Taliaferro and 
Lobell’s ‘type III’ of neoclassical realism (2016), which I consider suitable to explain 
Morocco’s change in foreign policy. This type, in short, depicts a realist external behaviour 
of states, in which the behaviour is influenced by the system and domestic factors. In 
Chapter 4, the research method, the case, the variables and the operationalization of this 
study are set out. Chapter 5 elaborates on the empirical analysis in the relation between the 
EU and Morocco divided in three sub-categories; migration, terrorism and the Western 
Sahara. For each sub-category I argue that either a change in reciprocal importance occurred 
between Morocco and the EU favouring Morocco or a clear domestic discontent occurred 
caused by the relation with the EU. In respect of migration, I find evidence of both. Finally I 
discuss the validity of neoclassical realism and the hypotheses together with the main 
findings.  
2. Literature review  
 
How Morocco’s political landscape is approached in the literature  
This research focuses on explaining Morocco’s changed behavior towards the EU. Little to 
no literature directly addresses this subject or Morocco’s external behavior in general. This 
as a result of years of stable and uneventful governance before the Arab Spring (Fernandez-
Molina 2015, 9). I therefore broadened the subject of this literature review and assessed 
what the literature tells about essential aspects of Moroccan decision making in general. 
What aspects did other scholars address while researching Morocco and what is seen as 
essential in Moroccan policy making? What level of analyses is used: system, domestic or 
actor? The scholars mentioned in this review do not all directly address Morocco’s foreign 
policy change, but do address Moroccan policy making. I use this literature review to build 
on other scholars’ findings on Morocco and to see whether aspects are missing in the 
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literature. From this basis I will select a theoretical approach to conduct this research. Two 
main issues prevail as important while analyzing literature.  
First, the literature takes the Moroccan system as one that upholds democratic and 
authoritarian characteristics. As Ter Laan (2016) elaborates in her book, Morocco is a 
democracy by its constitution, although it certainly is not a paragon of democracy. The 
Moroccan system is a multi-party system forcing parties to cooperate in order to form a 
coalition (Ter Laan 2011, 583). So, on paper the system appears to have some characteristics 
of a democracy. However, the actual implementation falls short. The interest and trust of 
Moroccans in politics is rather low. This causes a low election turnout 3 , low political 
participation and subsequently low expectations on what politicians can achieve. Poorly 
functioning party politics that lack any substantial influence on actual policies are the 
consequence (Daadaoui 2010, 5; Ter Laan 2011, 583; Maghraoui 2011, 681/4). The 
literature also centers on the King as only and most important decision maker. The King has 
a decisive function, creating elected politicians to barely have influence on the large 
majority of policies (Benchemsi 2013, 20). The little literature directly addressing the role of 
the King of Vermeren (2009), Benchemsi (2012/2013) and Fernandez-Molina (2015) above 
all buttresses the importance of him on Morocco’s policy. Especially Bechemsi (2012a) 
takes a hard stance.   
“a closer look can see that behind the elaborate democratic veneer lies an archaic and 
corrupt absolute monarchy. It is a regime under which the three fundamental powers of 
government—executive, legislative, and judicial—are subjected to the will of one man; where 
this man’s cronies act as puppetmasters of the political system and ransack the economy; and 
where those who dare to speak out against abuses are promptly crushed.” (67) 
The political direction the state takes, all relevant decisions and all (foreign) policies are in 
control of the King. Moreover, he heads every cabinet meeting and is capable of firing 
Ministers at his own will. Almost all scholars addressing the political realm in Morocco 
solely use the King as `central decision maker´ (Ottaway and Riley 2006, 3; Mohsen-Finan 
& Zeghal 2006, 85; Arieff 2012, 5; Vermeren 2009, 129-31; Ter Laan 2011/2016, 58-9; 
Koprowski 2011, 19; Gallala-Arndt 2012, 141; Benchemsi 2012/2013, 21). In short, I take 
from these aspects that Morocco is a hybrid regime, including domestic factors which are 
overshadowed by autocratic characteristics (Desrues 2013).  
                                                                 
3
 Generally less than 50%  available at <http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/146/ >  
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Second, up until the events of the Arab Spring the King was lighthearted about his 
position and wide supported unrest. The Arab Spring has become the essential tipping point 
in this situation, endangering domestic stability. The public has become more outspoken and 
demanding, changing the King’s attitude and policy (Lynch 2012; Benchemsi 2012b). As a 
result of the Arab Spring terrorism also increased influencing the King’s policy even more. 
The events demonstrably influenced Morocco’s policy. In the years from the Arab Spring 
onwards, the King’s domestic and (making this aspect valuable) foreign policies can be 
traced back to a result of threats for domestic instability caused by the Arab Spring 
(Fernandez-Molina 2011, 439; Lalami 2011; Arieff 2012, 10; Desrues 2013; Hoffman & 
Konig, 2013; Benchemsi 2012a/2012b, 26). Although the King himself has not yet 
personally been attacked in the protest, he realizes that his position will be in danger when 
unrest will erupt and the country will disintegrate4. This led to a policy in which the King, 
out of fear for unrest, tightened his control on the status quo, whereby opposing the origin of 
the protest “all process of domestic change (edit result Arab Spring) […] are heavily 
influenced by the interest of the King” (Maggi 2013, 30). The literature explicitly mentions 
that the King reacts to the groups but hardly accommodates the demands in policy; he reacts 
by safeguarding domestic stability and his position (Fernandez-Molina 2011/2015; 
Benchemsi 2012/2013; Maggi 2016). Fernandez-Molina (2015, 7) mentions the following 
about the aftermath “Even though it did not result in democratization […] they have 
involved an increase […] on the domestic constrains exerted on the central decision-making 
unit”. So, the demands of the public, able to pose such threat for the King, matter indirectly. 
What directly matters are the King’s policies to diminish public instability and maintain the 
status quo. This includes meeting the demands or to actively counter them, as long as the 
policy manages to diminish the threat for the King’s position.  
 Alongside with the domestic transition discussed in the literature, I argue that a 
power transition favoring Morocco over the last years is influential for Moroccan policy. I 
have found that the consequences of this power transition are underexposed in the literature. 
Morocco seems to hold important cards in debates with the EU concerning migration and 
terrorism. This asks for an approach in which also international power changes (systemic 
analyses) are included. In addition, hybrid states in general pursue power preservation both 
internally as externally in a rather aggressive manner (Zakaria 1997) 5. In sum, a theory is 
                                                                 
4
 Seen in the aftermath of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt .  
5
 Zakaria uses the term illiberal democracies instead of hybrid regimes, which I perceive as interchangeable. 
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required which includes variables at the system level together with variables at the domestic 
level which both influence a central decision maker.  
Although Liberalism includes domestic factors in explaining a state’s behavior I do 
not see it as suitable for this research. Liberalism, with its focus on benign cooperation in 
and among states, is mainly used to explain the behavior of liberal and democratic states 
(Moravcsik 1997; Snyder 2004). Furthermore, according to Liberalism, the domestic 
influence should lead to policies equal to the domestic desires; representatives listen to the 
public and do not follow their own preferences (Moravcsik 1997, 513). In Morocco I do not 
observe this process from the literature. Domestic factors influence the King but the 
domestic factors are not heard and sometimes even opposed.  
Constructivism also appears suitable for incorporating domestic aspects, although the 
approach has its shortcomings for this research. This approach builds on changes in 
collective norms shared within a state as the bedrock of a state’s policy (Wendt 1992, 402). 
Policy and change originate from collective values and social identities. Despite Morocco’s 
shift in identity and general idea of the public demanding a more social society showcased in 
the Arab Spring, it is not translated into politics. The domestic urge for changes is not 
accommodated into policy. So despite the new shared value in society it did lead to a 
change. The approach thereby opposes the idea of a prescribed national interest and leader-
driven power politics (Hurd 2008), a characteristic of Morocco I obtain from the literature 
and the assumption of Morocco as a hybrid state. Constructivism is mainly successful in 
explaining processes of liberalization and a growing importance on human rights 
(Finnemore, 1996). An aspect wanted by the mass but not incorporated in Morocco’s policy.  
The expected change in Morocco’s relation with the EU provides systemic 
incentives. Together with the pursuit of power seen in hybrid explanation of states, a 
framework tends to be found in the family of realist theories. Realist theories focus on the 
struggle of power, state preservation, systemic incentives and a policy of self- interest (Waltz 
1979; Mearsheimer 2001). However, the majority of realist theories fail to include domestic 
variables in the explanation of a state’s foreign policy and merely consider the driving forces 
behind a state’s behavior to be founded at the system level. Inside the realist family, one 
approach provides room for assessing both internal and external aspects separately in 
explaining Morocco’s foreign policy: neoclassical realism.  
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3.  Theoretical argument  
Neoclassical realism shares with realism its view on the power struggle between 
states as being of prime importance. Simultaneously however, the importance of the 
domestic circumstances on a state’s policy is recognized. This joint focus on international 
incentives and the domestic context, predominantly explain the choice for neoclassical 
realism in this research. I argue that neoclassical realism and especially Ripsman, Taliaferro 
and Lobell’s (2016) model of type III neoclassical realism is suitable to explain change and 
incorporate external and internal incentives in a state’s behavior. Because their model is 
almost entirely embedded in and building upon neoclassical realism, I first elaborate on the 
general aspects of neoclassical realism, after which I specify the characteristics of type III 
neoclassical realism.  
 Neoclassical realism is a relatively new track inside realism, dating from the end of 
the last century. The idea of neoclassical realism stems from neo-realism yet seeks to better 
explain the unsatisfying explanations of neo-realism for differing states’ policies in response 
to similar international events. “Neoclassical realism seeks to explain variation in the foreign 
policies of the same state over time or across different states, facing similar external 
constraints” (Taliaferro et al. 2009, 21). Neoclassical realism distinguishes several key 
characteristics of States (Schweller 2004; Zakaria 1998; Wohlforth 1993; Rose 1998, 152; 
Taliaferro et al. 2009, 21). Most importantly, it holds that states are not similar in their 
reaction to and perception of international stimuli. This thesis is defined by Taliaferro et al. 
2009 as;  
“[…][N]eoclassical realism locates causal properties at both the structural and unit 
levels, the unit-level factors help to explain state external behavior.” (page 21)  
“Neoclassical realists [….] view policy responses as a product of state–society 
coordination and, at times, struggle.” (page 27)  
So, a state’s reaction to international stimuli (events, changes or threats) is not a 
predetermined, identical process for every state. Its reaction is influenced by domestic 
circumstances shaping a state’s policy towards international stimuli. Thus, it follows that 
international stimuli can be perceived paramount by one country and as unimportant for 
another country. States can “channel, mediate and (re)direct” (Schweller 2004, 164) foreign 
policy according to their domestic situation. A state’s domestic level serves as a filter 
11  
through which a state’s decision on foreign policy funnels and is mediated. The aspects 
covered by these domestic circumstances are ‘comprehensive’. These can include: the elite, 
institutions, organization, civil societies, political parties but also domestic unrest and 
protests. Which elements matter is different for each country and needs to be disclosed for 
every country separately.  
 The selfish behavior of states, and consequently “[..] the conflictual nature of 
politics [..]” (Taliaferro et al. 2009, 19) – which is an important tenet of realism – is still 
present in neoclassical realism. Although the domestic factors of a state are considered as 
intervening variables creating differences in states’ behavior, a state is still predominantly 
occupied with its own survival. The domestic circumstances can never cause a deviation 
from the states final endgame of survival and power (Rose 1996, 146). It solely provides a 
temporary strategy in order to obtain a stronger position in respect of that goal. The state’s 
position in the anarchistic international system remains the bedrock of a state’s policy 
(Taliaferro et al. 2009, 22/43).   
 Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell (2016) extend the explanation of neoclassical 
realism. The above interpretations of neoclassical realism focus mainly on states’ reactions 
to specific short term events and are therefore not well-suited to address a broad policy 
change or strategy. Such short term events could for example be an invasion, attack or coup 
d’état happening inside or outside its borders. The policy in reaction to such events – which 
is the type of policy that former interpretations seek to explain – is mostly also a short term 
policy. Type III neoclassical realism provides a more comprehensive and a less directly 
power-driven approach towards foreign policy, being more concerned with the “broader 
patterns of international outcomes and structural change” (page x introduction). The scope 
of neoclassical realism is thus broadened in order to explain the long term foreign policy 
strategy of states. “We argued […..] that the potential scope of the dependent variables (edit 
international stimuli) for type III neoclassical realism grows over time and is much broader 
than previous neoclassical realists have heretofore acknowledged” (109).  
 According to Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell’s type III neoclassical realism, a 
state’s foreign policy/overarching strategy (being the dependent variable) is the interaction 
between two variables; the independent and the intervening variable. The independent 
variable is an opportunity or threat for a country present in the international system 
(systemic level). These opportunities or threats are balanced out by states in the context of 
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their power and position, which results in different opportunities or threats for each state. 
Similar to general neoclassical realism, the domestic intervening variable remains influential 
for a state’s reaction to international events. The difference here is that, due to the broadened 
studied scope of the state’s behavior; the intervening variable covers a broad domestic 
change or altered tendency in the state (94). Those aspects covered in the intervening 
variable remain the same as in the former versions.  
4. Research design  
4.1. The case 
The dependent variable in this case study is Morocco’s less cooperative attitude towards the 
EU. I observe a change in Morocco’s foreign policy from 2011 coinciding with the start of 
the Arab Spring in Morocco. From this point forward several Arab countries tumbled into 
chaos and disorder and subsequently international terrorism and emigration arose rapidly. I 
conduct this research till the beginning of 2017, after Morocco faced the summit of 
migration and terror threats. Possible explanations for Morocco’s policy change towards the 
EU are examined in this time frame. This research solely analyses the occurrence of the 
dependent variable and not its consequences. This subject is important for the EU, as 
Morocco and the EU closely cooperated and Morocco is very valuable to the EU. A better 
understanding of the causes of Morocco’s policy change might alter the EU’s  policy taken 
vis-à-vis Morocco. I do not directly expect the findings of this research to be applicable on 
other cases because Morocco’s current situation is too unique. Nevertheless, I see 
similarities with Turkey, a country that has also been changing its policy regarding the EU 
making it possible to draw parallels. Furthermore, Morocco shares characteristics with North 
African countries regarding migration and terrorism policies towards the EU. The 
development seen in Morocco can be a prelude for a change in these countries.  
4.2. Methodology 
This study is a single case study. I asses one single case (Morocco’s policy change towards 
the EU), which I try to explain by conducting in-depth research of both Morocco’s domestic 
as well as its international situation. Given that Morocco obtained and resumed close 
cooperation with the EU for a prolonged time but decided to open op to Africa and 
becoming reluctant in cooperation with the EU, this topic makes for a deviant case study. I 
test the hypotheses by using the congruence method. In this method, the values of the 
13  
independent variables and intervening variables are examined to see whether, and to what 
extent, they affect the value of the dependent variable of interest. When the values of the 
variables align with these predictions, the reliability of a causal relation is strengthened 
(George & Bennett 2005, 152). According to neoclassical realism a state’s foreign policy 
starts with an international posed threat or opportunity. The internationa l threat or 
opportunity is shaped by the independent variable. So to acquire congruence between the 
predictions of neoclassical realism and this research, the independent variable must include a 
threat or an opportunity (an international stimulus) vis-à-vis the EU. The threat or 
opportunity is mediated by the domestic situation (the intervening variable). To acquire 
congruence the intervening variable includes domestic conditions that influence a state’s 
policy. These conditions mediate and influence the role of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable, leading to a better explanation of the dependent variable. 
4.3. Operationalization 
This research is constructed by using both independent and intervening variables 
causing the hypotheses to cover two aspects; international changes (independent systemic 
variables) influencing Morocco’s external behavior and domestic factors influencing 
(domestic intervening variables) Morocco’s external behavior. The main hypotheses are 
formulated using the independent variable because, according to neoclassical realism, the 
international stimuli remain the bedrock of a state´s changed policy. The hypothesis of the 
intervening variable covers how the domestic conditions relate to the independent variable.  
The systemic independent variable changes for each hypothesis, addressing different sources 
capable of influencing Morocco´s policy. 
H1: Increased trans-border migration caused Morocco to alter its position 
vis-a-vis the EU. 
For H1 the independent variable is increased trans-border migration for Morocco. Morocco 
is omnipresent and actively involved with the EU in the migration crisis. I expect that the 
consequences of this crisis to have possibly led to a new relation between the EU and 
Morocco.   
H2: Increased international terrorism caused Morocco to alter its position 
vis-a-vis the EU. 
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For H2 the independent variable is increased terrorism. Morocco became subject to several 
terrorist attacks and is vigilant in order to prevent possible new attacks. Furthermore, 
radicalized Moroccans are broadly present in terrorist networks making it an issue of great 
importance for Morocco.  
H3: The intensification of the Western Sahara question caused Morocco to 
alter its position vis-a-vis the EU. 
For H3, the independent variable is the intensification of the Western Sahara question. 
Although the situation remained relatively unchanged, the conflict has intensified the last 
year as both the EU and Morocco publicly showcased their positions. The EU did so by 
annulling a trade agreement due to the question and Morocco by expelling UN-observers of 
the conflict. Because of the sensitivity of the question I expect that small changes in the 
variable can cause an enlarged reaction. Furthermore I see it as a subject of too much 
importance regarding Morocco’s foreign and domestic policy to be ignored. 
Three arguments justify the study and evaluation of the causal weight of these 
variables. First, these variables are among the most important aspects of the relationship 
between the EU and Morocco and feature widely in statements of both the EU and Morocco 
on their cooperation. Second, a substantial amount of academic literature addresses the role 
of these variables, which makes them suitable for an elaborate analysis. Third, with the 
exception of H3, these variables are subject to a change and assumedly also affected the 
relations between Morocco and the EU. If there are grounds for Morocco’s shift of focus 
vis-a-vis the EU, I expect them to be found in these cases. 
The time span in which H1 and H2 are tested, align with the time span of the 
dependent variable, so from 2011 till the beginning of 2017. I use two indicators to analyze 
the systemic consequences of each independent variable  and to indicate possible power 
transitions in the relation between Morocco and the EU: Morocco’s political interest in 
aligning with the EU and the EU’s political interest in aligning with Morocco. These 
indicators are chosen to portray a possible position change in the EU-Morocco relation. The 
level of analysis is therefore solely the international system. The value of the independent 
variables will be measured as an ordinal variable including the values  for the indicators; 
unchanged, low and high. These indicators align with neoclassical realism in which the 
value of the independent variable is embedded in international power indicators. Because the 
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Western Sahara question is not related to the Arab Spring, I research the period from 2009 
till 2017, a period including an intensification of the question (Fernandez-Molina 2016, 70-
3).   
            The domestic intervening variable is triggered by the independent variable and 
mediates the value of the independent variable, capable of strengthening or weakening the 
influence of the independent variable on the dependent variable. The intervening variable 
provides an additional level of analysis to better explain the dependent variable. For the 
intervening variable I use the following hypothesis.  
H4 (intervening): the independent variables mediated by the King´s perceived 
prospect of domestic political survival, caused Morocco to alter its position vis-
a-vis the EU. 
The intervening variable is the King´s perceived prospect of domestic political 
survival. I specify the value of the intervening variable by assessing any consequences for 
the King’s domestic political position. The strength of this intervening variable is also 
measured as an ordinal variable to portray the level of domestic prospect for the King. I use 
high and low as ranking for the prospect of domestic survival. I test the same intervening 
variable for each independent variable, to see whether and how they relate. Due to the 
King’s importance and command in Moroccan politics  -as mentioned in the literature 
review-, the value of the domestic variable is solely measured using the King as the ‘central 
decision maker’ of Morocco’s foreign policy (Vermeren 2009, 55-6). To determine 
the King´s prospect of domestic political survival as a result of the independent variable and 
subsequently its influence on the dependent variable, I use three indicators. These are the 
presence of youth unemployment, domestic terror threat, and nationalism/a sense of 
unity. These indicators are chosen because according to the literature from these aspects 
domestic unrest originates.  
4.4 Data collection 
The data I postulate my conclusion upon, mainly consist of qualitative primary and 
secondary sources. In order to analyze the EU’s stance, I chiefly use primary sources. The 
EU is an accessible institution which abundantly publishes documents concerning terrorism 
and migration. For both H1 and H2, I primarily use official EU publications to unravel the 
EU’s political stance. For the testing of H1, the EU’s specially targeted organization for 
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border control (Frontex), is a rich source of information on migration. Obtaining primary 
sources from the Moroccan side is more difficult. Morocco hardly publishes documents 
regarding its policy making process. Furthermore, due to the King’s pivotal position the 
policy making occurs rather individualistically and is not meticulously traced. In order to 
indicate Morocco’s stance, motive and position, I mostly focus on secondhand sources, 
consisting of academic publications and news articles. For H3, solely secondary sources are 
used. The sensitivity of the subject and the fact that both the EU and Morocco have hidden 
agendas on the subject, make it difficult to obtain primary sources. 
The ultimate aim of this research is building on the hypotheses to explain Morocco’s 
changed policy vis-a-vis the EU. However, the hypotheses are not verified in order to 
exclude each other mutually. I expect that each hypothesis, to a certain degree, offers a 
partial explanation to the main question. In the conclusion, the validity of each hypothesis is 
discussed individually and eventually jointly from the angle of the international aspect and 
the domestic aspect. This is in order to see if they, all together, provide an international and 
domestic causal logic for the changed policy towards the EU. 
5. Empirical section  
5.1 Migration 
Background 
The Moroccan-EU relation on migration has a long history. In the sixties the so-called 
Moroccan “guest workers” migrated from Morocco to Western Europe for work (Lahlou 
2015, 2). A substantial part of these workers decided to stay or were forced to stay due to the 
domestic situation in Morocco (Belair 2016, 1). However, it is not this historic relationship 
of migration which is at the forefront of the current discussions between Morocco and the 
EU on migration. The present debate on cooperation with respect to migration, concerns the 
illegal flow of immigrants into the EU via and from Morocco. The Arab Spring and 
subsequently the rise of ISIS, boosted the number of immigrants almost to 300.000 from 
both Arab and African countries to the EU (Cherti & Grand 2013, 10; UNHCR 2014; 
Frontex 2017).  
As Morocco is Africa´s most adjacent country to Europe and with a waterway of 
only 14 kilometers, it is a relatively easy hurdle to take for migrants pursuing their European 
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dream. This hurdle is not even always present: it is easier for migrants to reach European 
land through the Spanish enclaves in Morocco; Melilla and Ceuta (Lahlou 2015, 5; Frontex 
ARA report 2017). Once migrants have climbed the fence surrounding the enclaves and 
touched EU soil, they can start their bid for European asylum. Did twenty years ago only 
some Algerian and Moroccan fortune seekers try to reach Spain using this itinerary (De 
Haas 2005, 10), it now is a major migrant route to Europe (Katsiaficas 2016). Moreover, the 
migrants are not only Moroccans and Algerians anymore, but a diverse mix of migrants 
from Arab and Sub-Saharan countries (Frontex FRAN Q4 report 2015; Lahlou 2015, 2). 
This group finds themselves flocked in the bottleneck called Morocco, waiting to board a 
fragile boat or to storm a high fence surrounding the Spanish enclaves (Cherti & Grand 
2013: 49; Carrera et all 2016, 4). Currently the EU is trying to avoid the vast influx of 
migrants, being more than 10,000 in 2016 6 . Morocco is trying to avoid becoming an 
immigration country, and the migrants are trying to avoid remaining in Morocco. The EU is 
the only one being relatively successful in its aspirations. 
Morocco is more and more developing into an immigration country, which is 
contrary to its policy and vision of society (Nasser 2013, 16; De Haas 2015). An increasing 
number of Sub-Saharans have decided to accept Morocco as a second-best, after having 
given up their European dream. They currently live in large numbers in Fez, Tangier and 
Rabat (De Haas 2015; Lahlou 2015, 2; Carrera et all 2016, 5). Due to this inflow of Sub-
Saharans in Morocco, an economical circuit developed in Moroccan cities operated by Sub-
Saharans of specialized small businesses providing goods and services to Sub-Saharans 
(Cherti & Grand 2013: 45). These developments increasingly cause migrants to not even 
venture entering the EU. Morocco, scrutinized and accused by the EU of discriminating and 
neglecting these Sub-Saharan migrants, had to address the problem with serious policies 
(Médecins sans Frontières 2013; Belair 2016, 1-2). Noteworthy are the policies that allow 
migrants to obtain citizenship and that provide schooling opportunities for children from 
illegal migrants (Lahlou 2015, 12-4). However, the main reason for these policies are more 
perceived as political to improve its image regarding the EU and Africa, than as policies 
truly implemented to improve the life of illegal immigrants (De Haas 2014; Berriane et al. 
2015, 515-6; Carrera et all 2016, 10/12). As will be discussed in this paragraph, none of the 
                                                                 
6
 Exact numbers for the last three years (2014: 7840) (2015: 7164) (2016: 10231) available at 
<http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/western-mediterranean-route/>.   
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actors find themselves really comfortable with the current situation and interests are strongly 
opposing.   
EU-Morocco relation and increased migration (Systemic independent variable)  
The boost of migrants from 2011 onwards made the migration problem from a minor 
problem to a core element of EU policy towards Morocco (Yildiz 2016, 12-3). The EU was 
confronted with a tension between its wish to be an open society on the one hand and the 
fear of expected destabilizing effects of migration on the other hand (De Haas 2015; Carrera 
et all 2016, 4; Yildiz 2016, 13;), Thus, the EU, while remaining relatively open to ‘war 
refugees’, was less open to economic migrants from the Sub-Sahara (European Commission 
2016; Belair 2016, 1). To counter the problem of economic immigration from Sub-Saharan 
Africa, a policy was developed to better protect the EU’s outer borders (European 
Commission 2015) see also (Cherti & Grand 2013: 12; Noutcheva 2015, 24-5; Yildiz 2016, 
13-4; Carrera et all 2016, 1-2).  
It is this development which has created a new chapter in the Morocco-EU relation 
(Haas 2014). As evidenced by the refugee deal with Turkey, the EU is actively trying to host 
migrants outside of the EU (Natter 2013, 16; European Council 2015/2016; Zardo & 
Cavatorta 2016, 2). This policy is also reflected in the EU’s stance towards Morocco 
(Council of the EU 2013, 7). The current EU’s policy is to make Morocco responsible for 
countering migration or in EU’s words; “help (edit bordering countries) to stem irregular 
migration” (European Council 2015, 7) through the Western Mediterranean route (Natter 
2013, 15; Council of the EU 2013, 7; Belair 2016, 1). Where the other migrant routes 
diminished and the EU got a grip on the influx, this was not so for the Western 
Mediterranean route; the number steadily increased “With almost 2 757 detections (edit in 
the third quarter of May), the number of irregular migrants using boats to reach Spain, was 
78% higher than in […] 2015 and 50% higher than in the second quarter of 2016” (Frontex 
FRAN Q3 report 2016, 9) also see (Wittenberg 2017, 18). Aside from these sub-Saharans, 
an increasing amount of Moroccans, more than 20.000 in 2016 7, (Frontex FRAN report Q4 
2016, 8) tried to make their way into the EU and subsequently tried to stay (Berriane et al. 
2015, 506). This has created an even more delicate problem in EU-Moroccan relations. 
                                                                 
7
 This might seem contradict with the total number of illegal border crossings via Morocco in 2016, but 
Moroccan migrants use other migration routes too making their illegal passing’s higher than the total illegal 
crossings via Morocco.  
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Around a million illegal Moroccans are currently residing in the EU (European Union 2013, 
10). This group hardly gets granted asylum in the EU countries (Belair 2016, 7). With 
already a huge burden of hosting migrants from warzones (European Commission, 2016), 
the last issue the EU is eager to deal with are illegal Moroccan migrants. The pivotal issue 
here is that Morocco hardly cooperates with the repatriation of these migrants and wishes 
them to remain hosted in the EU (Haas, 2014; Hennebry et al. 2014, 69). The EU is 
presently paying for the shelter and food of thousands of illegal Moroccan migrants 
(European Commission, 2016).  
On the other hand, Morocco is currently supportive of the EU’s policy to prevent the 
migrants from reaching the EU, by hosting them in Morocco (Frontex AFIC report 2014, 33; 
Moroccan Government 2015 also see Cherti & Grand 2013: 12; Hennebry et al. 2014, 69; 
Lahlou 2015, 12; Carrera et all 1-2 2016). Obviously, Morocco’s cooperation with this 
policy has always come at a price (European Union 2013, 17). It gave Morocco the 
possibility to postulate a special relationship with the EU (Belair 2016, 1; Yildiz 2016, 171). 
Morocco demanded (and obtained) financial assistance -60 million in 20168- in exchange for 
its willingness to cooperate in the execution of the EU’s policy (Cherti & Grand 2013: 13; 
European Commission 2015; European Council 2015). 
Increased migration and the King’s prospect of domestic survival (domestic intervening 
variable) 
From a domestic perspective, Morocco is not positive on hosting migrants within its borders 
at all (Wunderlich 2012, 1423; Carrera et all 2016, 5/7). If it was up to Morocco it would 
freely let both Sub-Saharan and Moroccans migrants try to reach European soil rather than 
having them stay in Morocco. The unease with the current situation has three main reasons. 
Firstly, with an already very high unemployment rate, an influx of foreign work forces leads 
to even higher unemployment rates (Hennebry et al. 2014, 69; Belair 2016, 1). Sub-Saharans 
accept an income lower than Moroccan workers and create unequal competition for the 
Moroccan jobseekers, increasing unemployment and discontent with the state (De Haas 
2014).  
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 Exact numbers are difficult to obtain. It is rather difficult to demarcate funds directly linked to migration, 
funds which partly help Morocco to host migrants and funds which have nothing to do with migration but are 
indirectly given to Morocco in exchange for hosting Migrants. The EU pins the amount on 60 million see 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/morocco_en  
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The second point concerns the position of the Moroccan migrants. “From the 
Moroccan perspective, migration constitutes a vital development resource that alleviates 
poverty and unemployment, increases political stability and generates remittances. In the 
context of the Arab Spring and increasing domestic pressure for reform, emigration is 
believed to have an important stabilizing function” (Haas 2014). Morocco rather sees its 
uneducated and unemployed youth leave and find work outside of Morocco, and especially 
in the EU. Preferably, Morocco would therefore rather not cooperate with the EU on this 
subject (El Qadim 2015, 229-38; Belair 2016, 1). Despite the fact that it might seem curious 
to not prevent your inhabitants from departing, it makes sense. Living standards and social 
security are high in the EU, creating little incentive for Morocco to repatriate this group (De 
Haas 2015). More importantly, due to strict Moroccan family ties and government control, 
the focus of the migrant will remain in Morocco (Fargues & Fandrich 2012, 8; Berriane et 
all 2015, 510).Finally, this results in generous remittances from these immigrants to their 
Moroccan families, once they have found a (illegal) job (Worldbank 2015 9). These foreign 
exchanges are a welcome contribution to the Moroccan society, by alleviating poverty and 
creating domestic investments (De Haas, 2014). Furthermore it pales the support provided 
by the EU on migration10.  
I argue that H1 is confirmed only when mediated by H4. Increased migration made it 
possible for Morocco to change its policy towards to the EU, as the EU’s interest in aligning 
with Morocco was high. Yet, the systemic consequence of increased migration falls short in 
explaining why Morocco used this option to turn away from the EU. In combination with 
H4, increased migration provides an argument for change. The domestic consequences of 
the increased migration - increased unemployment rate and a diminished level of 
remittances- is disadvantageous for the King due to the possibility of domestic unrest. The 
King’s position is strengthened when fewer migrants would remain in and return to 
Morocco, a situation achievable when Morocco shifts from the EU. In this light I see H4 in 
combination with H1 confirmed.   
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 The last decade remittances were around 7.3% of the GDP for Morocco. Available at 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?end=2015&locations=MA&start=2006&vie
w=chart>.  
10
 Morocco receives around 60 million each year for hosting migrants while the remittances yearly exceed 6 
billion (see link above). Important to note here: the majority of these remittances are not from illegal 
Moroccans in the EU. Although, even when 1% of the remittances were done by Moroccans illegal residing in 
Morocco it would still exceed the EU’s aid on migration by millions. 
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5.2 Terrorism  
Background 
The Moroccan society is almost intertwined with terrorism, as terroris t threats and 
counter terrorism policies have become part of the daily life. Terrorist groups have had a 
longtime presence becoming only a serious actor since the terror attacks of 9-11. Terrorist 
groups used the instability and power vacuum after the Arab Spring to gain prominence 
throughout the region. This increase also affects Morocco where groups tried and try to 
destabilize the country. Morocco is one of the most moderate Islamic countries and 
relatively open to other religions (Tadlaoui 2015, 3). A vast group in Morocco opposes this 
open stance and wishes Morocco to be more fundamental in its religious policies.  The idea 
that the King has a religious heritage and a religious function 11  is also opposed by this 
group, directing part of their anger directly towards the King (Arieff 2012, 7; Benchemsi 
2013, 21; Ter Laan 2016, 59). Presently this group exists of religious intellectuals and 
youngsters seeking social shelter and acceptance inside the fundamental family (Dialmy 
2005, 68). The religious group can count on an increase of support from uneducated, 
unemployed and neglected young men who cannot escape their circle of poverty and are 
thus easily exposed to fundamentalists’ teachings (Dialmy 2005, 70; Coleman 2006; Masbah 
2015, 3; Huber 2017, 118). This fundamentalist education makes them prone to enhancing a 
hostile approach towards society (Dialmy 2005, 69/79). The group’s method to pursue 
change is by using violence and conducting attacks, a method shown to be effective in 
destabilizing the country.  
Morocco was startled by a terrorist attack in 2003 which caused 45 deaths and over a 
hundred injured. These ‘Casablanca bombings’ were conducted by Islamic fundamentalists 
aiming to target western spots and places with a Jewish heritage (Arieff 2012, 7). The 
attacks caused a wave of outcry throughout the  country against any kind of terror and 
demands were made for a harsh approach (Arieff 2012, 10; Bartolucci 2015, 111). The 
bombing exposed Morocco’s vulnerability to possible terrorist attacks. The assaulters came 
from shanty towns north of Casablanca and were neglected and excluded from society 
(Dialmy 2005, 77). Despite their perceived inferiority they diminished tourism and got the 
country off track for a few years. The number of tourists visiting the country stalled 
                                                                 
11 
The royal family of Morocco -the Alawite dynasty- claims to be descendants of Prophet Mohammed. This 
makes the King the religious leader of Morocco, the head of all Moroccan Muslims and Saint -like.  
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immediately, having a negative effec t on Morocco’s economy (Worldbank 2017).The shanty 
towns were violently raided making the inhabitants feel even further excluded from 
Moroccan society (Dialmy 2005, 77). After the attacks Morocco reacted vigorously, 
heralding a period of strict laws (law 03.0312) and fierce discourse regarding terrorism13 
(Koprowski 2011,15; Arieff 2012, 10; Bartolucci 2014, 13; Wainscott 2015, 641-2; 
Alexander 2017, 14).  
EU-Morocco relation and the increased terrorism threat (systematic independent variable)  
Morocco’s importance for the EU in fighting terrorism is rooted in two aspects. 
Firstly, Morocco has a decade’s long experience in fighting drug traffic. Part of the tactic 
tackling drug traffic was infiltrating in the process and the smuggle routes. This provided the 
Moroccan government with detailed in-depth intelligence of the routes and those involved 
(Masbah 2015, 1). Those present in the drugs traffic were and are often young, poor, 
uneducated men, vulnerable for the ideas of radical Islam or familiar with those adhering 
radical Islam (Dialmy 2013, 71; Masbah 2015, 1). This made the drug routes a useful hub in 
the terrorism network. Having informants almost everywhere in the network was extremely 
useful for Morocco in fighting terrorism. Secondly and more obvious; relatively many 
Moroccans are adherents of the radical Islam and Morocco is the second biggest provider of 
IS-fighters (Masbah 2015, 1). This made the fight on terrorism of paramount for Morocco 
and caused that European states often turn to Morocco for information about Moroccan 
terrorists (Arieff 2012, 6-7). 
The EU’s stance on terrorism is rather obvious. The terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 
ushered in a period in which counter terrorism prevailed on the EU’s agenda, posing a threat 
to the EU stability (Argomaniz 2015 192-3). Since the rise of the Islamic fundamentalist 
terror threat, the stance of the EU became quite simple; do everything required to counter it 
(European Council 2015; Argomaniz 2015). For Morocco this means that; “in the context of 
the EU's growing cooperation with third countries in the fight against terrorism, Morocco is 
a key country and could become the "pilot" country for actions with other partners in the 
                                                                 
12
 This law provides the state with a broad liberty to counter the extremely broad definition of a “terrorists”. 
Any small scale sign of extremism is punished with a minimum of ten years in prison  Law 03-03, “Loi 
Relative à la Lutte contre le Terrorisme“ < Law on the fight against terrorism >. 
Available at  <http://adala.justice.gov.ma/production/legislation/fr/penal/luttecontreterrorisme.htm> 
13
 Speech Mohammed VI Discours de S.M le Roi Mohammed VI suite aux attentats de Casablanca du 16 mai 
2003. < Speech given by His Majesty King Mohammed VI following the Casablanca bombings of 16 May 
2003> Available at  <http://www.maroc.ma/fr/discours-royaux/discours-de-sm-le-roi-mohammed-v i-suite-aux-
attentats-de-casablanca-du-16-mai-2003>  
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region” (ENPI 2013, 10). The rise of Muslim terrorism made Morocco significantly more 
important to the EU and the EU partly depended on Morocco (Koprowski 2011, 17; 
Mackenzie 2013; 147; European Union 2013; Ilbiz et al. 2015, 11-2; Tadlaoui 2015, 4; 
Monar 2015, 344; European Parliament 2017). Both in Paris and Brussels searches for 
terrorists were partly successful due to information provided by Moroccan authorities 
(Tadlaoui 2015, 4). Also when it comes to the prevention of possible terrorist attacks, 
Moroccan intelligence is paramount and a close cooperation, boosted by the rise of ISIS, 
exists between Morocco and the EU (Ilbiz et al. 2015, 11-3). The migration crisis created a 
delicate discussion on the division of responsibilities between Morocco and the EU: the 
inflow of migrants could be perceived as a failure of adequate border protection policies by 
Morocco. However, the rise of international terrorism has not resulted in the imposition of 
further international obligations upon Morocco. Every little detail obtained by EU´s 
intelligence services coming from Morocco is welcome. 
An increased terrorism threat and the King’s prospect of domestic survival (domestic 
intervening variable)  
For Morocco, boosting the anti- terror policy is like killing two birds with the same stone. 
Morocco is extremely happy with its current unique status in the Arab world; the Arab 
Spring did not work out positively for the majority of Arab countries. Morocco’s relatively 
stable situation makes it extremely interesting for partnerships, foreign investments and 
tourism (Arieff 2012, 4). Secondly, the presence of the threat of terrorism is for the time 
being also to a certain extent useful for the King. The fear present in society caused by 
terrorism, gives the King sufficient leeway to fight any opposing voices heard in society 
(Lalami 2011b; De Mas 2013, 53; Wainscott 2015, 641). Thus, there is no reason to believe 
that the cooperation on terrorism bothers Morocco in any way, on the contrary: the terror 
threat suits the King in following through a harsh policy on opposing voices. This explains 
from the domestic point of view why the King is actively pursuing a foreign policy of 
cooperation on terrorism. 
H2 provides a clear change although I find no arguments linked to explaining 
Morocco’s foreign policy change. Morocco’s intelligence clearly led to a more important 
position vis-à-vis the EU, resulting in serious need to align with Morocco for the EU. 
Nevertheless, a high value on this variable falls again short to explain why Morocco turned 
from the EU. The domestic factor also fails to explain Morocco’s turn. No unsatisfying 
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aspects were present for the King as a result of the cooperation with the EU on terrorism. H2 
is both solely and in combination with the intervening variable H4 rejected. Nevertheless H2 
provides a power increase in Morocco’s position vis-à-vis the EU.  
5.3 The Western Sahara question  
Background 
The root of the Western Sahara conflict is the withdrawal of Spain (1975) from its former 
colony the Western Sahara. Both Morocco and Mauritania claimed to have rights in respect 
of the territory, while the indigenous group Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y 
Río de Oro (POLISARIO) fought for its right to self-determination. A 16-year long war 
erupted, resulting in Mauritania withdrawing its claim (Stephan & Mundy 2010, 4-6). The 
war ended in a ceasefire with no clear winner. The POLISARIO fighters proclaimed their 
own state: Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). However, they only control a small 
piece of land positioned at the east side of the Western Sahara and rely heavily on the 
backing of Algeria for their survival. The tension of war is still tangible and a wall, 
constructed by Morocco, is currently dividing the warring parties (Stephan & Mundy 2010, 
4-6). This conflict has not gone unnoticed by the international community. The 1991 
ceasefire was implemented by the United Nations (UN) and overseen by peacekeepers from 
the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) (White 
2015, 345). Initially a referendum on self-determination was supposed to be held among the 
citizens of the Western Sahara. This referendum however was -and is- blocked endlessly by 
both parties due to the opacity on eligibility (Theofilopoulou 2012, 691; White 2015, 345). 
Currently SADR possesses only 20% of the Western Sahara, the other part is controlled by 
Morocco. The UN considers the Western Sahara to be a non-self-regulating country, 
meaning it does not accept SADR as a state. SADR indeed misses some key elements of 
statehood, with a population within the SADR territory of not over half a million and a large 
part of the population as well as the government being exiled in Algeria (Pham 2010, 12-8). 
EU-Morocco relation and the increased Western Sahara stalemate (systemic independent 
variable)  
Morocco wants the EU to acknowledge that the Western Sahara is, as a whole, part of its 
territory (Benaddallah 2009, 420). Officially the EU opposes Morocco´s claim on the 
Western Sahara. However, the EU, on purpose, never goes public with its position in respect 
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of the conflict (Gillespie 2009, 91-2), as the member states fail to align themselves in respect 
of the choice between a desirable friendship with Morocco on the one hand and the EU’s 
role as a protagonist of self-determination for suppressed populations on the other hand 
(Benaddallah 2009, 433; European council 2013; Grande-Gascón 2017, 80-1). The southern 
countries France and Spain are relatively open to the idea of the Western Sahara being part 
of Morocco (Gillespie 2009, 93; Stephan & Mundy 2010, 75/80-81). In stark contrast, 
Sweden continues to argue for a free Western-Saharan state (Darbouche & Zoubir 2008, 
101; Gillespie 2009, 96). This internal trouble causes the EU to be parsimonious in 
addressing the issue (Gillespie 2009, 93). Although the EU would like to ignore the Western 
Sahara, it cannot (Darbouche & Zoubir 2008, 102). The policy of self-determination for the 
indigenous people is a route irreversible for the EU (Benaddallah 2009, 433). This continues 
to create problems in the relationship between the EU and Morocco, for example when it 
comes to establishing treaties (White 2015, 350-1). Since 2012 the question tensed as the 
subject prevailed on the EU’s foreign agenda again. A lingering lawsuit on the applicability 
of a trade agreement to the Western Sahara arose. The Court of Justice of the European 
Union stated in 2017 that the trade agreement between the EU and Morocco was not 
applicable to the territory of the Western Sahara, which outraged Morocco (Court of Justice 
of the European Union 2016; European Parliament 2017; Aljazeera 2017).  
An increased Western Sahara stalemate and the King’s prospect of domestic survival 
(domestic intervening variable)  
The importance of the Western Sahara as a domestic factor within Morocco started with the 
Green March in 1975. A crowd of 350.000 boisterous nationalists waving Moroccan flags, 
walked into the Western Sahara in order to settle the area and emphasize its Moroccan 
legacy (White 2015, 345). With the initiation of the Green March, Morocco and especially 
former King Hassan II, decided to take a hard stance on the situation; an irreversible stance 
which had to be followed by his son Mohammed VI (Stephan & Mundy 2010, 216-17). This 
means that every deviation of this chosen route would be considered as Morocco losing face 
(Stephan & Mundy 2010, 56). Although the continued occupation of the Western Sahara is a 
substantial financial burden for Morocco, it is also useful and used for feeding nationalism 
(Pham 2010, 12; Stephan & Mundy 2010, 43). In a country with different tribes, 
communities and opinions, the Western Sahara serves as the cement of the society. It is used 
to ease down the population by creating a common enemy (Damis 2000, 28; Mohsen-Finan 
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& Zeghal 2006, 84; Stephan & Mundy 2010, 43; Mundy 2017, 62-3), postulated by Damis 
(2000, 28) as “To distract public attention from domestic problems and stifle political 
dissent”. Furthermore it legitimizes the need for a strong regime: “The prolonged crisis at 
the heart of the Moroccan state, the Western Sahara impasse, has become central to the 
legitimation of the Moroccan regime and its ability to construct a comprehensive apparatus 
capable of governing a diverse and divided population” (Mundy 2017, 64). It helps the King 
in preserving his strong domestic position (Willis 2009, 233). Morocco however also 
understands that the EU will not change its stance on the Western Sahara anytime soon, 
because it is just as deadlocked in the situation as Morocco is. To keep the nationalist fire 
burning Morocco needs to search for other options to include the Western Sahara in its 
territory, or at least keep up the appearance that it is  a prosperous process (Mundy 2017, 62-
3).  
I see H3 as the only hypothesis confirmed without the direct meditating of the 
intervening variable. As seen in the developments over the last years, the Western Sahara 
provided an argument for Morocco to become less dependent on the EU. Having a pivotal 
partner refusing to fulfill a wish must have been a thorn in the Moroccan eye. Nevertheless I 
consider the changes in this variable as too low and insufficient to explain the policy change 
on its own, as the Western Sahara had always been a delicate and controversial issue in the 
relation. Mediated by H4 I see a strengthened argument for why the Western Sahara is a 
tipping point in Morocco’s policy towards the EU. The unifying factor of the Western 
Sahara became more important than before due to domestic instability. A loss in believe of 
prosperity on the Western Sahara claim among the population takes away the unifying 
factor, undermining the King’s position. So the weak international changed value is 
strengthened by the domestic factor providing an aspect of greater importance. The 
mediating value of the intervening variable is high confirming H4 for this variable.   
6. Conclusion  
This study sought to explain Morocco’s changed policy regarding the EU. Ripsman, 
Taliaferro and Lobell’s explanation of a state’s foreign policy was used for this research. In 
performing this research I assessed international variables (systematic level) a nd domestic 
variables (individual level) to explain Morocco’s external policy change.  
This research has led to a strong confirmation of the first and fourth hypothesis 
together; increased trans-border migration and the perceived domestic survival of the King. 
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The analyses of the domestic and the international factor in respect of the cooperation 
between the EU and Morocco on migration, explain why Morocco has taken a different 
position towards the EU. This explanation centers on the increase of Morocco’s power and 
leverage in its relation with the EU as well as on the serious domestic problems migration 
causes in the Moroccan society. Morocco’s relevance for the EU grew as it held the key to 
successful execution of the EU’s policy. If Morocco ceases to fulfill its obligations under the 
migration agreements with the EU, it is the EU that will experience the consequences. For 
the EU Morocco’s role in the migrant crisis became too valuable to react with 
countermeasures. The King can thus take a different stance without directly jeopardizing 
Morocco’s position and facing consequences. At the same time the King became more 
occupied with stabilizing the country and his position. The EU’s demands on migration 
contain perceived threats to the domestic stability. More unemployed youngsters and fewer 
remittances jeopardize the economy and thereby indirectly the Kings situation. Because it is 
not in Morocco´s interest to comply with the EU, it is a logical choice for the King to turn 
away from close cooperation with the EU in this respect and so safeguard his position.  
The second hypothesis -Increased international terrorism caused Morocco to alter 
its position vis-a-vis the EU- is rejected both individually and in combination with H4. 
Nevertheless, I see the results as useful in the broader light of the research. Whereas the 
study of the increased terrorism portrays a change in Morocco’s position, it has not led to an 
explanation of the specific change. The value of the domestic intervening variable resulting 
from the international change is also not pervasive in providing an argument for the changed 
policy. This hypothesis holds an increased leverage for Morocco in its relation with the EU. 
Morocco’s position strengthened in light of the EU’s dependency on Moroccan intelligence 
and thus caused an increased Moroccan value for the EU. Nevertheless, Morocco’s strong 
position in the fight against terror neither provides threats, nor any domestic undesirable side 
effects for the King’s domestic survival. Therefore, grounds for a changed policy towards 
the EU are lacking. From the perspective of international terrorism the King has no urge to 
change its policy. Although there is no reason for the King to change his policy vis-à-vis the 
EU in respect of cooperation on terrorism, being of more value made a development towards 
less obedience in Morocco’s policy towards the EU possible. This increased leverage adds 
up to Morocco’s increased influence in the field of migration. Leverage fostering Morocco´s 
capacity to, harmless vis-à-vis its relation with the EU, solve the domestic discontent caused 
by migration.  
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The third hypothesis, the intensification of the Western Sahara question, as expected 
did not include a strong stimulus although it was the only hypothesis to provide a mild 
argument for change. Linked to the intervening variable, the Western Sahara brings a more 
solid argument. The increased domestic situation made the issue of the Western Sahara more 
important for Morocco and as a result the EU’s uncooperativeness in the recognition 
pressing. A nationwide success in obtaining control over the Western Sahara question, or at 
least obtaining recognition for its claim from its partners, is beneficial for Morocco, as it 
helps to provide for the required unity in Morocco. For Morocco the annulled trade 
agreement is another affirmation of adversity on its Western Sahara claim, reinforcing the 
continuity of the EU’s unwillingness to recognize Morocco’s claim. Given the importance of 
the Western Sahara issue domestically, it is understandable that Morocco insists on the 
necessity that its partners, amongst them the EU, should recognize its claim on the Western 
Sahara. The EU fails to fulfill Morocco’s wishes, which renders the EU less important for 
Morocco in this respect. The deadlock of uncooperativeness due to the EU´s annulled 
agreement together with the increased domestic tense situation, explains Morocco´s growing 
desire to turn from the EU. At the same time, I concluded that Morocco has become more 
powerful in its relation with the EU in respect of the other two cases that were discussed in 
this research. Logically, this created leeway for the King to focus increasingly on obtaining 
the Western Sahara. This includes a policy in which the EU upholds a position less 
important than previously. 
Overall, I see a change in Morocco’s international value for the EU. Morocco 
became increasingly important and even essential for the EU in fulfilling external policies. 
Although the independent variables solely fall short in providing a convincing argument to 
explain Morocco’s changed policy vis-à-vis the EU, the domestic events that unfolded in the 
relevant period for this study, fill this gap. Combined with the increased importance seen in 
the independent variables, the King’s fear of domestic instability provided incentives to 
deviate from a EU focused policy. So, a combination of the international and domestic 
variables provides an explanation for Morocco’s change policy; a perceived opportunity for 
Morocco at the systemic level -the increased leverage- where the intervening variable at the 
domestic level directs how to deal with this opportunity. For both H1 and H3 the intervening 
variable H4 changed the original value in such a way that it led to an explanation of 
Morocco’s policy change. So in conclusion, neoclassical realism has been useful for 
focusing on international and domestic factors. It rightfully argues that neither international 
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nor domestic factors alone can explain a state’s policy. Nevertheless, for this research solely 
the issue of the increasing migration, the interaction between the independent variable and 
the intervening variable depicted a clear causal logic for Morocco’s changed policy. For the 
other hypotheses of this research the prescribed values of the process between the 
independent and intervening variable were weak or not present. Furthermore the congruence 
method mostly focuses on correlation of the variables and falls short in exposing causal 
relation between the variables. Process tracing would have overcome this problem but the 
absence of sources from Morocco’s decision making, expectedly caused an unsatisfying 
research.   
In order to arrive at a broad, comprehensive understanding of Morocco’s foreign 
policy, other research should focus on Africa’s and the Middle-Eastern potential regarding 
Morocco. Africa experienced a rapid economic growth over the last decade. I do expect this 
development in Africa contributing to Morocco’s changed policy towards the EU. 
Furthermore I advise for further research to pay attention to the unrest in Arab countries. 
The disintegration of several Arab states possibly contributed to Morocco’s rapprochement 
towards Africa and not to the Middle-East. I hope that combined further research will 
eventually lead to a comprehensive overarching explanation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30  
7. Bibliography  
 
Alexander, Y. (2017) “Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2016” Inter-University 
Center for Terrorism Studies. 
 
Aljazeera (2017) Are Morocco and EU heading towards a political impasse? 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/03/morocco-eu-heading-political-
impasse-170301102342685.html.  
 
Argomaniz, J. O. Bures, C. Kaunert (2015) “A Decade of EU Counter-Terrorism and 
Intelligence: A Critical Assessment” Intelligence and National Security 30:2-3, 191-
206.  
Arief, A. (2012) “Morocco: Current Issues” Congressional Research Service. 
 
Bartolucci, V. (2014) “Security vs. Liberty: The Discourse on Terrorism in the United States 
and Morocco and Its Societal Effects” Democracy and Security 10:1, 1-21.   
 
Bel-air, F. (2016) “Migration profile Morocco” Migration Policy Center Issue 05.  
 
Benabdallah, K. (2009) “The position of the European Union on the Western Sahara 
conflict” Journal of contemporary European Studies Vol. 17 No. 3, 417-435.  
 
Benchemsi, A. (2012a) “Morocco: Outfoxing the Opposition” Journal of Democracy 
Volume 23, Number 1. 57-69. 
Benchemsi, A. (2012b) "Feb20's Rise and Fall: A Moroccan Story" Mamfakinch, 
https://www.mamfakinch.com/feb20s-rise-and-fall-a-moroccan-story/. 
Benchemsi, A. (2013) “Mohammed VI, despote malgré lui” Pouvoirs N. 145, p. 19-29. 
 
Berahab, R.  (2017) “ Relations between Morocco and sub-Saharan Africa: What is the 
potential for trade and foreign direct investment? ” OCP Policy Center, Policy Brief 
PB-17/04.  
 
Berriane, M., H. De Haas & K. Natter (2015) “Introduction: revisiting Moroccan 
migrations” The Journal of North African Studies Vol. 20, No. 4, 503–521. 
Carrera, S., J. Cassarino, N. El Qadim, M. Lahlou, L. den Hertog (2016) “EU-Morocco 
Cooperation on Readmission, Borders and Protection: A model to follow?” CEPS 
Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 87 / January.   
Cherti, M. & P. Grand (2013) “The myth of transit: Sub-Saharan migration in Morocco” 
London institute for public policy research.  
Coleman, I. (2006) “The Arab world is experiencing the first tremors of a youthquake” 
Council on foreign relations.  
31  
Council of the European Union (2010) Joint statement European Union-Morocco Summit 
Granada, 7 March 2010 Brussels, 7 March 2010 7220/10 (Presse 54) 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/113247.pdf.  
 
Council of the European Union (2010) Thirteenth meeting of the EU-Morocco association 
council http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14906-2015-INIT/en/pdf. 
 
Council of the European Union (2013) Joint declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership 
between the Kingdom of Morocco and the European Union and its Member States 
Brussels, 3 June 2013 (05.06) (OR. fr) https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what- is-
new/news/news/2013/docs/20130607_declaration_conjointe-
maroc_eu_version_3_6_13_en.pdf. 
Court of Justice of the European Union (2016) PRESS RELEASE No 146/16 Luxembourg, 
21 December The Association and Liberalisation Agreements concluded between the 
EU and Morocco are not applicable to Western Sahara 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-12/cp160146en.pdf. 
Daadaoui, M. (2010) “ Party Politics and Elections in Morocco” The Middle East Institute 
Policy Brief No. 29. 
 
Damis J. (2000) “ King Hassan and the Western Sahara” Magreb Review 25: 13-30. 
Darbouche, H., Y. H. Zoubir (2008) “Conflicting International Policies and the Western 
Sahara Stalemate” The International Spectator 43:1, 91-105. 
 
Desrues, T. (2014) “Mobilization in a hybrid regime: the 20th February movement and the 
Moroccan regime” Current Sociology, 61(4), 409-423. 
  
Dialmy, A. (2005) “ Le terrorisme islamiste au Maroc” Social Compas 52(1), 67–82. 
 
Direction des Etudes et des Prévisions Financières (DEPF) (2015) “ Relations Maroc – 
Afrique: ambition d’une «nouvelle frontière ”.  
El Qadim, N. (2015), “Le gouvernement asymétrique des migrations. Maroc/Union 
Européenne” Dalloz. 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) (2013) Morocco strategy 
paper 2007 – 2013.  
 
European Commission (2015)  
http://ec.europa.eu/antitrafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/communication_on_the_eur
opean_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf 
 
European Commission (2016) Morocco European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement 
Negotiations https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
nlargement/neighbourhood/countries/morocco_en. 
32  
 
European Council (2015) Council conclusions on counter-terrorism  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150209-council-
conclusions-counter-terrorism/.  
 
European Parliament (2007)  directorate-general for external policies policy department 
Counter-terrorism cooperation with the Southern Neighbourhood 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/578013/EXPO_IDA(2017)
578013_EN.pdf. 
 
Fargues F., C. Fandrich (2012) “Migration after the Arab Spring” european university 
institute (mpc). 
 
Finnemore, M. (2006) National Interests In International Society (New York: Cornell 
University Press).  
 
Fernandez-Molina, I. (2011) "The Monarchy Vs. The 20 February Movement: Who Holds 
the Reins of Political Change in Morocco?" Mediterranean Politics 16:435-41. 
Fernandez-Molina, I. (2016) Moroccan Foreign Policy under Mohammed VI, 1999-2014 
(Cornwall: Rouledge) 
Frontext (2014) “Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community Joint Report” (AFIC) 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/dec/eu-africa-frontex-intell-report-2014.pdf. 
 
Frontext (2015) “Frontex Risk Analysis Network Quarterly Report Four” (FRAN Q4) 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q4_2015.pdf. 
 
Frontext (2016) “ Frontex Risk Analysis Network Quarterly Report Four” (FRAN Q4) 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q4_2016.pdf. 
 
Frontext (2016) “Frontex Risk Analysis Network Quarterly Report Four” (FRAN Q3)  
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q3_2016.pdf. 
Frontext (2017) “western Mediterranean route” http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-
routes/western-mediterranean-route/. 
 
Frontext (2017) “Risk Analysis for 2017” (ARA) 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_201
7.pdf. 
Gallala-Arndt, I. (2012) "Constitutional Reforms in Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Jordan: A 
Comparative Assessment" Panorama, 141-44. 
George, A. L., A. Bennett. 2004. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge: The MIT Press). 
33  
Gillespie, R. (2010) “ European Union responses to conflict in the western Mediterranean” 
The Journal of North African Studies, 15:1, 85-103. 
 
Haas, H. (2005) “Maroc: De pays d'emigration vers passage migratoire Africain vers 
l'Europe” Migration Policy Migration Policy. 
Haas, H. (2014) “Maroc: Préparer le Terrain pour devenir un Pays de Transition 
Migratoire? ” Migration Policy.  
Hennebry, J., K. Kopinak, R. Mª S. Miras, A. T. Requena, P. Hondagneu-Sotelo 
(2014) From “Khadema” to “Zemegria”: Morocco as a “Migration Hub” for the EU 
In Territoriality and Migration in the E.U. Neighbourhood Editors M. Walton-Roberts 
J. Hennebry. (Springers: The Netherlands).  
Huber, D. (2017)  “Youth as a New ‘Foreign Policy Challenge’ in Middle East and North 
Africa: A Critical Interrogation of European Union and US Youth Policies in Morocco 
and Tunisia”   European Foreign Affairs Review, Issue 1, pp. 111–128. 
 
Hoffman, A. & C. Konig (2013) “Scratching the democratic façade: Framing strategies of 
the 20 February Movement” Mediterranean Politics, 18(1), pp. 1-22. 
 
Hüllen van, V. (2012) “Europeanisation through Cooperation? EU Democracy Promotion in 
Morocco and Tunisia” West European Politics, 35:1.  
 
Hurd, I. (2008) “Constructivism.” In The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. 
Edited by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, 298–316. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
 
Ilbiz, E., C. Kaunert, D. Anagnostakis (2015) “The counterterrorism agreements of Europol 
with third countries: Data protection and power asymmetry, Terrorism and Political 
Violence. 
Katsiaficas, C. (2016) “Asylum Seeker and Migrant Flows in the Mediterranean Adapt 
Rapidly to Changing Conditions” Migration Policy Institute.  
Koprowski, A. (2011) “Restrictions on the Press under King Mohammed VI and Morocco's 
Obligations under International and Domestic Laws on Freedom of Expression” Muslim 
World Journal of Human Rights, 7(2). 
Laan ter, N. (2016) Dissonant Voices Islam-inspired Music in Morocco and the Politics of   
Religious Sentiments PhD thesis Radboud University.  
 
Laan ter, N. (2011) “Onder het wakend oog van de koning, de 20 februari beweging in 
Marokko” Internationale Spectator Jaargang 65 N. 11.  
Lahlou, M. (2015) “Morocco’s Experience of Migration as a Sending, Transit and Receiving 
Country” IAI Working Papers 15 |30.  
 
Lalami, L. (2011) "The Moroccan 'Exception'." The Nation, August 24. 
http://www.thenation.com/article/162967/moroccan-exception 
34  
 
Lobell, S. E., N. M. Ripsman, J. W. Taliaferro (2009) Neoclassical Realism, the state, and 
foreign policy. (Cambridge: Univertsity Press). 
Lynch, M. (2012) The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East. 
(New York: PublicAffairs). 
MacKenzie, A. C. Kaunert, S. Léonard (2013) “EU Counterterrorism and the Southern 
Mediterranean Countries after the Arab Spring: New Potential for Cooperation? ” 
Democracy and Security, 9:1-2, 137-156.  
Maggi, E. M. (2015) in Euro-Mediterranean Relations after the Arab Spring – Persistence 
in Times of Change. edited by J. Horst, A. Jünemann and D. Rothe (Farnham: 
Ashgate). 
 
Maggi, E. M. (2016) The Will of Change (Springer Fachmedien: Wiesbaden). 
Maghraoui, D. (2011) "Constitutional Reforms in Morocco: Between Consensus and 
Subaltern Politics" The Journal of North African Studies 16:679-9. 
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics  (W.W. Norton & Company). 
 
Mas De, P. (2013) “De lange arm van de koning: veiligheids- en inlichtingendiensten en de 
Marokkaanse diaspora” Internationale Spectator Jaargang 67 N. 11. 
Masbah, M. (2015) “Moroccan Foreign Fighters” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs.  
  
Mdaghri, D. A. (2009) Une ambition Marocaine “des experts analysent la decennie 1999-  
2009.  
Medicines sans Frontiers (2013) Violence, Vulnerability and Migration: Trapped at the 
Gates of  Europe 
http://www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/migrants_in_morocco_report.pdf.   
 
Miller, S. G. (2013) A History of Modern Morocco (Cambridge University Press). 
Mohsen-Finan, K., M. Zeghal, (2006) “Opposition islamiste et pouvoir monarchique au 
Maroc. Le cas du Parti de la Justice et du Développement”  Revue française de science 
politique /1 (Vol. 56), p. 79-119.  
 
Monar J. (2015) “The EU as an International Counter-terrorism Actor: Progress and 
Constraints” Intelligence and National Security 30:2-3, 333-356.  
Moravcsik, A. (1997). “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International 
Relations.” International Organization 51. 513–553. 
Moroccan Government (2016) Morocco's Migration Policy Highlighted in Brussels 
http://www.maroc.ma/en/news/moroccos-migration-policy-highlighted-brussels. 
35  
Mundy, J. (2017) in  The Geopolitical Functions of the Western Sahara Conflict: US 
Hegemony, Moroccan Stability and Sahrawi Strategies of Resistance  Published in 
Global, Regional and Local Dimensions of Western Sahara’s Protracted Decolonization 
When a Conflict Gets Old (Eds.)Ojeda Garcia, Raquel, Fernández-Molina, 
Irene, Veguilla, Victoria (Palgrave Macmillan: New York).  
Natter, K. (2013) “The Formation of Morocco’s Policy Towards Irregular Migration (2000–
2007)” International Migration Vol. 52 (5) 2014.  
Noutcheva, G. (2015) “Institutional Governance of European Neighbourhood Policy in the 
Wake of the Arab Spring” Journal of European Integration, 37:1, 19-36. 
 
Ottaway, M., M. Riley. (2006) “Morocco: From Top-down Reform to Democratic 
Transition?” Carnegie Papers 71. 
 
Pham, P. (2010) “Not another failed state: towards a realistic solution in the Western Sahara” 
The journal of the Middle east and Africa 1:1-24.  
Rachik, A. (2016) La societe contre l’etat ‘Mouvements sociaux et strategie de la rue au 
Maroc (Casablanca: La croisee de chemins). 
Ripsman N., J. Taliaferro, E. Lobell (2016) Neoclassical realism Theory of International 
Politics (Oxford University Press).  
 
Rose, G. (1998) “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy” World Politics, Vol. 
51, No. 1 pp. 144-172. 
 
Schweller, R. (1998) Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World 
Conquest. (New York: Columbia University Press).  
Snyder, J. (2004) “One World, Rival Theories.” Foreign Policy 145 November/December: 
52–62. 
 
Stephan, M. & J. Mundy (2010) Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict 
Irresolution (Syracuse University Press). 
Tadlaoui, G. (2015) “Morocco’s religious diplomacy in Africa” Fride Policy Brief 196.   
Theofilopoulou, A. (2012) “Morocco's new constitution and the Western Sahara conflict – a 
missed opportunity? ” The Journal of North African Studies, 17:4, 687-696. 
 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2014) UNHCR calls for urgent 
European action to end refugee and migrant deaths at sea. Geneva. 24 July, 
http://www.unhcr.org/ 53d0e2d26.html.  
 
Vermeren, P. (2009) Le Maroc de Mohammed VI la transition inachevee (Chellah Livres).  
Wainscott, A. M. (2015) “Defending Islamic education: War on Terror discourse and 
religious education in twenty-first-century Morocco” The Journal of North African 
Studies, 20:4, 635-653.  
36  
 
Waltz, K. N. (1979) Theory of International Politics (Illinois: Waveland press). 
Wendt. A. E. (1992) “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construct of power 
politics” International organization 46(2), 391-425. 
 
White, N. (2015) “Conflict stalemate in Morocco and Western Sahara: Natural resources 
legitimacy and political recognition” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 
42 No. 3, 339-357.  
Willis, M. J. (2009) “ Conclusion: The Dynamics of Reform in Morocco, Mediterranean 
Politics, 14:2, 229-237. 
 
Wittenberg (2017) “Managing Mixed Migration: The Central Mediterranean Route to 
Europe,” International Peace Institute. 
 
Wohlforth, W. C. (1998) realism and foreign policy published in Foreign Policy: Theories, 
Actors, Cases (Oxford, Oxford University Press). 
 
Worldbank (2015) Personal remittances, received (% of GDP) Morocco 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=MA.  
 
Worldbank (2015) International tourism, expenditures 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ST.INT.XPND.MP.ZS?end=2015&locations=MA&
start=2001. 
Wunderlich, D. (2012) “The Limits of External Governance: Implementing EU External 
Migration Policy Journal of European Public Policy 19:9, 1414-1433.  
Yıldız, A. G. (2016)The European Union’s Immigration Policy Managing Migration in 
Turkey and Morocco (UK: Palgrave Macmillan).  
  
Zakaria, F. (1997) “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy” Foreign Affairs Vol. 76, No. 6 (Nov. 
- Dec., 1997), pp. 22-43. 
 
Zakaria, F. (1998) From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role. 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). 
Zardo, F., F. Cavatort (2016) “What is New in the ‘Borderlands’? The Influence of EU 
External Policy-Making on Security in Tunisia and Morocco after the Uprisings. 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS. 
 
 
 
